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CURRENT ISSUES IN REMOVAL JURISDICTION
ALAN

B. RICH*

I.

INTRODUCTION

THIS PAPER EXPLORES recent developments and
changes in the law of removal and remand. Recent is,
of course, a relative term. Although most attorneys regularly practice in federal court, it is not unusual to go for an
extended period of time, perhaps even years, between removing a case from state court or seeking to remand one.
In this context, therefore, recent encompasses the last few
years, with emphasis on the changes made in removal and
remand procedure by the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988 (the Judicial Improvements
Act).' In addition, some common removal and remand
traps are discussed.
II. BACKGROUND

Sections 1441 through 1452 of the Judicial Code 2 contain the great majority of removal and remand law. In addition to those sections of the Judicial Code, certain
* J.D., magna cum laude, 1984, University of Illinois, College of Law, Order of
the Coif. Junior Shareholder, Litigation Section, general trial and appellate law,
Johnson & Gibbs, P.C., Dallas, Texas. Member: Dallas Bar Association, American
Bar Association, Fifth Circuit Bar Association, Supreme Court Civil Rules Revision Task Force Consultive Group. Other publications include: The Judicial Improvements andAccess to Justice Act: New Patent Venue, Mandatory Arbitration and More, 5
HIGH TECH. L. J. 311 (1990). Sanctions Under Texas Rule 13, to be published in 11
REV. LITc. (1991).

1 Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified in and amending scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
§§ 1441-1452 (1988).
2 28 U.S.C.
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specialized statutory schemes, such as the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989
(FIRREA), 3 the Securities Act of 1933, 4 and the Federal
Employer's Liability Act (FELA) 5 also provide removal
and remand provisions.
Section 1441 contains the four general categories of removable actions. 6 First, section 1441(a) provides for the
removal of an action where the federal district court
would have diversity jurisdiction. Second, section
1441(b) provides for removal when the federal district
court has federal question jurisdiction. Third, section
1441 (c) provides that "separate and independent" claims
or causes of action which, if sued upon alone would be
removable, may be removed even if joined with non-removable claims or causes of actions. Fourth, Section
1441(d) provides that a foreign state which qualifies as
such under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act may remove an action from state to federal court. In addition to
Section 1441 which sets out the types of removable actions, Section 1445 makes certain actions non-removable.
A.

Section 1441(a)

A number of interesting questions and recent developments arise under the diversity removal provision, including what constitutes "citizenship", the issue of fraudulent
joinder, and the jurisdictional amount.
1. Citizenship
Diversity of citizenship must exist both at the time the
original action was filed and at the time of removal. 7
When a corporation is a party to a diversity suit, the question of corporate citizenship can sometimes be perplexing. The general citizenship rule is easily stated: a
s 12 U.S.C.S. § 1461 (Law Co-Op 1991).
4 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1988).

45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1988).
28 U.S.C. § 1441(a)-(d) (1988).
OJB, Inc. v. Dowell, 650 F. Supp. 42, 43-44 (N.D. Tex. 1986).

7 See e.g.,
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corporation is a citizen of its state of incorporation and
the state wherein its principal place of business is located.
However, identifying the principal place of business is not
always simple. The Fifth Circuit embraced a test for determining a corporation's principal place of business characterized as the total activity test.8 The Fifth Circuit test is
really a combination of the two other principal place of
business tests which courts employ: nerve center test and
place of operations test. In the Fifth Circuit's view, the
total activity test considers both "the general rules of the
'place of activities' test and the 'nerve center' test in the
light of the particular circumstances of a corporation's organization" in order to "balance the facts to determine
the ultimate question: the location of the corporation's
principal place of business." 9
Generally speaking, the nerve center test is a back-up
test used when a corporation's operations are so far-flung
that it is extremely difficult to pick one particular place of
operation which can be said to be the primary one.' 0
Thus, in a situation where there is a single place of operation and a headquarters located in another state, the principal place of business is under the total activity test will
likely be the place of operations. The Fifth Circuit court
also examined other situations where more significant activity at the corporate headquarters might outweigh actual
operations." The analysis operates on a sliding scale,
which is often difficult to gauge with any degree of certainty, and without significant bright-line rules.
An interesting Ninth Circuit case' 2 recently examined
the nerve center and place of operations tests, and held
that the place of operations test prevails over the nerve
center test when the two conflict. 13 In Industrial Tectonics,
the Ninth Circuit was faced with a case where a company
'J.A. Olson Co. v. City of Winona, Miss., 818 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 412.
,old. at 411.
II /d.

Industrial Tectonics, Inc. v. Aero Alloy, 912 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir. 1990).
in Although the Ninth Circuit's analysis did not call itself the "total activity"
12
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had the majority (around 60%) of its operations in California, yet had a very substantial minority of its operations
(about 40%) and its corporate headquarters, its nerve
center, in Michigan. This scenario is the most difficult
one in deciding where a corporation's principal place of
business is located. If a corporation's operations were
evenly split between two states, yet one state also contained the corporation's "brain," it seems that under any
test the balance should be struck where half of the operations plus the headquarters are located. Thus, the question put to the Ninth Circuit was, essentially, just how
much of the operations must be located in one state such
that it outweighs a substantial minority of operations plus
the existence of the nerve center located in a different
state.
Apparently, the Ninth Circuit found that a simple majority of operations was sufficient to outweigh the existence of the nerve center in another state, even if that
nerve center was coupled with a substantial minority of
the corporation's operations. The Ninth Circuit specifically held "where a majority of a corporation's business
activity takes place in one state, that state is the corporation's principal place of business, even if the corporate
headquarters are located in a different state."14 The
Ninth Circuit's approach seems to embrace at least this
limited bright-line rule. In this area, the more bright-lines
the better. What a terrible waste it would have been ifj.A.
Olson Co. and Industrial Tectonics had been post-trial cases
which the appellate courts felt bound to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
2.

FraudulentJoinder

Fraudulent joinder is a means of destroying diversity of
citizenship requirements in removal actions.' 5 Until retest, the Ninth Circuit's application and harmonization of the two components of
that test were not different from the Fifth Circuit's "total activity" test.
14 Id. at 1094.
'- See Great N. Ry. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 281-82 (1918).
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cently, the Fifth Circuit's seminal case on fraudulent joinder has been B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co..16 Now, however,
the Fifth Circuit may be taking a different position on the
fraudulent joinder question with a7 recent decision out of
the Eastern District of Louisiana.'
B., Inc. stands for the proposition that the removing
parties claiming fraudulent joinder have a heavy burden
to show that there is no possibility that a valid state law
claim can be stated against defendants allegedly fraudulently joined.'8 B., Inc. also states that current state law is
not necessarily determinative of the fraudulent joinder issue, especially where the applicable state law is uncertain.' 9 The Court found that even an arguably reasonable
basis for predicting that state law might impose liability
on the facts involved suffices to make joinder non-fraudulent. 20 For determining whetherjoinder is fraudulent, the
B., Inc. court approved a procedure which allows the district court to consider not only the plaintiff's pleadings,
but the affidavits and depositions of all parties. 2 ' In fact,
the B., Inc. court analogized the scope of the record which
could be considered in resolving the fraudulent joinder
question to summary judgment practice under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(b).
The Fifth Circuit's recent Carriere case, while relying
upon B., Inc., seems to have gone far beyond the procedural limitations that B., Inc. imposed. The Carriere court
has taken the summary judgment allusion in B., Inc. and
applied it quite literally. 23 Where the B., Inc. court al16 663 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1981).
17 Carriere v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 893 F.2d 98 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct.
60 (1990).
18 B., Inc., 663 F.2d at 549, 551.
to Id. at 549-50.
20 Id. at 550 (citing Bobby Jones Garden Apartments v. Suleski, 391 F.2d 172,
177 (5th Cir. 1968)).
21 B., Inc., 663 F.2d at 549.
22

Id. at 549 n.9.

Carriere, 893 F.2d at 100. "While we have frequently cautioned the district
courts against retrying a case to determine removal jurisdiction, we have also endorsed a summary judgment-like procedure for disposing of fraudulent joinder
claims." Id.
2
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lowed evidence outside of the pleadings to be considered
in deciding the fraudulent joinder question, the panel limited the use of that evidence to deciding whether the
plaintiff succeeded in stating some possible claim under
24
state law against the supposedly fraudulent defendant.
In other words, the B., Inc court contemplated consideration by the district court of the pleadings and the other
fraudulent joinder evidence merely to determine whether
a cause of action has been or could possibly be stated on
those facts. The B., Inc. court did not endorse a procedure
where pleadings and fraudulent joinder evidence are examined for the very different purpose of weighing
whether the plaintiff could ultimately recover against the
defendant on the facts presented.
That the Carrierecourt has gone beyond B., Inc. and has
blended the propriety of summary judgment on the merits with the fraudulent joinder question is indisputable.
This represents a major alteration, and a singular anomaly, in fraudulent joinder jurisprudence. The Carriere
court specifically stated that "[b]ecause we have already
concluded that Sizeler was fraudulently joined, we need
not consider appellant's argument on this point [the propriety of summary judgment] further. Summary judgment will always be appropriate in favor of a defendant
against whom there is no possibility of recovery. "25
The Carriere court's acknowledgment that the state
court petition alleged just what it needed to allege under
Louisiana law to state a cause of action against one defendant bolsters the fact that the approach has changed.26
The court, although acknowledging the petition, considered only the affidavits and found that the plaintiffs
"could not possibly recover" from that defendant.27 As to
another supposedly fraudulently joined defendant, the
plaintiff apparently had an argument for the good faith
24
2-

B., Inc., 663 F.2d at 549, 551 n.14.
Cariere, 893 F.2d at 102.

2, Id.
27

Id.

at 101.
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extension of current Louisiana premises liability law to allow a cause of action against this other defendant.28 Yet,
the Carrierecourt considered only the current state of Louisiana law on this point and found fraudulent joinder.29
The difference in procedure between piercing the
pleadings and considering other evidence to determine
whether a colorable claim has been stated (the proper
analysis), versus a full-blown summary judgment type inquiry (the improper analysis), was recognized by a recent
Third Circuit case. 3 0 The Third Circuit's position is truer
to B., Inc., than is the Fifth Circuit's own Carrierecase. It
will be interesting to note whether future Fifth Circuit
cases will expand upon Carriereand make fraudulent joinder removal easier or whether it will retreat to the B., Inc.
position.
Fictitious Defendants

3.

The Judicial Improvement Act worked several changes
in removal procedure. Section 1016(a) of the Judicial Improvements Act added a new sentence to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a), instructing that for purposes of removal, citizenship of defendants sued "under fictitious names" are
This section, of course, is a congresto be ignoredA.'
sional reversal of Bryant v. Ford Motor Co. 32 and Coker v.
Amoco Oil Co. 33 which made the presence of "Doe" defendants destructive of diversity.
4. JurisdictionalAmount
The Judicial Improvement Act amended the diversity
Id. at 101-02.
Id. In fact, the Carriere opinion did not even acknowledge the rule in B., Inc.
regarding the consideration of possible extensions of current law. Id.
3 See Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S.Ct. 959 (1991).
- 28 U.S.C. § 144 1(a), as amended by Judicial Improvements and Access to justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988).
32 844 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. granted, 488 U.S. 816, grant of cert.
vacated and denied, 488 U.S. 986 (1988).
.- 709 F.2d 1433 (11th Cir. 1983).
28
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jurisdiction provision of the Judicial Code to raise the jurisdictional amount to $50,000, from the previous amount
34
of $10,000.
B.

Section 1441(b)

Turning to federal question jurisdiction as a basis for
removal, there are two nuances worth noting. First, removal can be based on complete preemption by federal
statute and, second, the concept of "derivative removal"
has been eliminated.
1.

Complete Preemption

The affirmative defense of federal preemption of the
plaintiff's state cause of action does not constitute a federal question for the purpose of federal jurisdiction and
removal. 5 However, since the Supreme Court's decision
in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor,36 an exception
known as the complete preemption doctrine holds that if
certain federal statutory schemes completely fill a field of
law, there is no longer any "room" for state causes of action. 7 Therefore, any attempt to plead a state cause of
action in such an area is merely a disguised way of pleading a federal cause of action. As thus recharacterized, the
case becomes removable to federal court as a federal
question. It is most common for the complete preemption doctrine to arise in either the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA)3 1 context,39 or where the action involves a matter covered by a collective bargaining
agreement under federal labor law.4 °
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201(a), 102 Stat.
4642, 4646 (1988).
4

35Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987).
- 481 U.S. 58 (1987).
Id. at 64.
.,Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461
(1988).
-11,
See Ramirez v. Inter-Continental Hotels, 890 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1989).
4" See Richardson v. United Steel Workers of America, 864 F.2d 1162 (5th Cir.
1989).
37

1991]

REMOVAL JURISDICTION

403

A recent development in this area, one significant to
aviation law, was the Fifth Circuit's decision in Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Mattox.4 ' In TWA, the Texas attorney general filed suit in Texas state court against Pan American
World Airways alleging deceptive trade practices under
state law in connection with airfare advertising. The Fifth
Circuit held, after a careful analysis of Section 105(a)(1)
of the Deregulation Act 42 and case law thereunder,4 3 that
Congress intended to occupy the field of alleged deceptive airline fare advertising so that state laws regulating
that subject matter are entirely excluded. 4 Therefore, a
facially state law cause of action alleging deception in airline pricing can be removed to federal court.45
2.

Derivative Removal

The derivative removal concept, which held sway for
decades, stated that when a plaintiff brought a claim in
897 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 307 (1990).
49 U.S.C. app. § 1305(a)(1) (1988).
43 See Illinois Corporate Travel v. American Airlines, 889 F.2d 751 (7th Cir.
1989) (Illinois Consumer Fraud act claim based upon alleged anti-competitive activity consisting of refusing to honor tickets issued by travel agents who engage in
discount pricing or discount price advertising is preempted); New England Legal
Foundation v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 833 F.2d 157 (1st Cir. 1989) (state imposed landing-fee scheme preempted); O'Carroll v. American Airlines, 863 F.2d
11 (5th Cir. 1989) (state law claims by passenger removed from aircraft after causing a disturbance preempted); Hingson v. Pacific Southwest Airlines, 743 F.2d
1408 (9th Cir. 1984) (state laws concerning handicap discrimination preempted),
Anderson v. USAir, 818 F.2d 49 (D.C. 1987) (same). The Fifth Circuit in TWA
also rejected several lower court holdings contrary to its decision. See New York v.
Trans World Airlines, 728 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); California v. Trans
World Airlines, 720 F. Supp. 826 (S.D. Cal. 1989); Kansas v. Trans World Airlines, 730 F. Supp. 366 (D. Kan. 1990); People v. Western Airlines, 155 Cal. App.
3d 597, 202 Cal. Rptr. 237 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985). Also, the
court distinguished Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, 426 U.S. 290 (1976), which allowed fraud claims to proceed regardless of the CAB's authority over "deceptive
practices" because Nader was decided prior to the addition of the express preemption provision.
41
42

44

TWA, 897 F.2d at 778-83.

- Note that although state laws and causes of regulating airline rates, routes
and services are completely preempted by the Deregulation Act, state courts still
have jurisdiction over such claims. Federal Express. v. Pub. Serv. Comm., 925
F.2d 962, 967-68 (6th Cir. 1991). Therefore such claims may validly be litigated
in state court if the parties do nothing to remove the case or remove it improperly.
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state court over which the federal courts had exclusive jurisdiction, that case could not be removed, as the federal
courts' removal jurisdiction was said to be "derivative" of
that of the state court. Therefore, the argument went, because the state court did not have jurisdiction over the
case, the federal court could acquire none.46 In 1986,
Congress abrogated the concept of "derivative removal"
by enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1441(e).
C.

Section 1441(c)

Section 1441(c) 47 allows removal of "separate and independent" causes of action which are within the jurisdiction of the federal district court, even if those causes of
action are joined with other causes of action outside the
federal court's jurisdiction. 48 Federal courts have a strict
view of what types of claims are "separate and independent" and removals on this ground are seldom successful.49
Recently, section 1441(c) was significantly amended by
Title III of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990.50 Section 312 of this Act eliminated the removal of separate
and independent diversity claims, only allowing removal
of separate and independent federal question claims.
Section 1441(c) also empowers the federal court to hear
the entire case or remand matters in which state law
predominates.
D.

Section 1441(d)

The most interesting question surrounding removal
See Brandon v. Interfirst Corp., 858 F.2d 266, 269 (5th Cir. 1988).
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1991).
48 Note that the provision relates only to pendent claims which are "separate
and independent," not to separate and independent claims which are made only
against parties over whom the federal courts would have no basis for subject-matter jurisdiction.
41, Such removals have occasionally been successful. See Recognition Equip.,
Inc. v. Mohawk Data Sciences Corp., CA3-88-0761-T (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 1988).
An in-depth discussion of what constitutes a "separate and independent" claim or
cause of action is beyond the scope of this paper.
- 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) as amended by Pub. L. 101-650, § 312, 104 Stat. 5089,
5114.
46

41
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under the foreign sovereign removal provision, section
1441(d),'5 involves the treatment of co-defendants who
are not covered foreign sovereigns. In 1980, the Fifth
Circuit held that removal by a foreign sovereign removed
the entire case against all defendants, including domestic
co-defendants.52 The Fifth Circuit's decision in Arango occurred, however, prior to the Supreme Court's recent
landmark decision on pendent-party jurisdiction.53 After
Finley, the Ninth Circuit held that a multiple defendant removal under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and
section 1441 (d) was proper. 4 Although the Ninth Circuit
did not discuss Finley by name, the court's analysis certainly parallels its analysis of the propriety of pendentparty jurisdiction. 55 The Ninth Circuit opinion clearly implies that section 1441(d) and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act were intended by Congress to provide for
pendent-party jurisdiction.56
E. Pendent Parties
A thorough discussion of the complex statutory and
constitutional questions surrounding pendent-party jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this paper.5 7 Pendent-party
jurisdiction is, however, relevant to questions of removal
and remand not only in the context of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 58 , but also in the context of separate
1 28 U.S.C.

§ 1441(a) (1988).
Arango v. Guzman Travel Advisors Corp., 621 F.2d 1371 (5th Cir. 1980).
5 Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). In brief, Finley held that, assuming that pendent party jurisdiction is constitutional under Article 333, such jurisdiction is still unavailable to the federal courts unless Congress authorizes its
exercise by statutory means. Id. at 549.
See Chuidan v. Philippine Nat'l Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1990).
52

55

Id.
Id.

But see Birkinshaw v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 126
(E.D. Pa. 1989) (jurisdiction is not proper over domestic defendants joined with
foreign defendants removed under § 1441(c) without independent basis for jurisdiction over the domestic defendants).
57 For essential reading on this subject, see Finley v. United States, 490 U.S.
545 (1989) and Alumax Mill Products, Inc. v. Congress Fin. Corp., 912 F.2d 996,
1005-07 (8th Cir. 1990) (discussion of the court's ability to assert pendent-party
jurisdiction).
as See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
56
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and independent claim removal under section 1441(c).
After Finley, two federal district courts have discussed
whether section 1441(c) is itself a statutory basis for the
exercise of post-removal pendent-party jurisdiction. Furthermore, section 310 of the 1990 Act has both expanded
and contracted the scope of pendant-party jurisdiction.
1. Pre-1990 Act Cases
The northern district of Ohio has held that section
1441(c) is not a statutory basis for allowing pendent-party
jurisdiction.5 9 In Perkins, a non-diverse defendant had
pendent state law claims made against him in a case involving a Title VII claim against other defendants. After
removal, the court held that even if the claims against the
non-diverse pendent-claim defendant were "separate and
independent," jurisdiction could not be exercised because
there was no independent basis for federal jurisdiction
over that defendant.60 Jurisdiction was improper since
Congress, under section 1441(c), did not grant pendentjurisdiction to the federal courts. 6 '
The northern district of Illinois, however, allowed an
exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction under section
1441(c). 62 The pendent party in Carter, as a co-plaintiff
rather than a co-defendant, brought a section 1983 claim
for wrongful arrest. The claimants were husband and
wife. The wife, as co-plaintiff, also sued the same defendants under state law for loss of consortium. 63 The Carter
court recognized the existence of Finley, but followed a
previous Seventh Circuit analysis that held pendent-party
jurisdiction is proper, unless Congress expressly prohib511 Perkins v. Halex Co. Division of Scott Fetzer, 744 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ohio
1990).
Id. at 173-76.
Id.
62 Carter v. Dixon, 727 F. Supp. 478, 480 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
w, Id. at 478. The Carter case is highly unusual and without precedent because
the pendent party is also a co-plaintiff. The district court justified allowing pendent-party plaintiff jurisdiction because the defendants removed the case to federal court. Id. at 479.
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ited the action. 64 Perkins justifiably criticizes Carter for
adopting authority which was superseded by Finley.6 5 The
Ohio court probably has the better argument.
Although not cited in support of its position, the Perkins
court may have relied on section 1447(e) of the Judicial
Code, recently added by the Judicial Improvements Act.66
Instead of supporting pendent-party jurisdiction in the removal context, section 1447(e) shows a clear congressional intent to forbid pendent-party jurisdiction in the
removal context.6 7
The amended section 1447(e) addressed situations
where, after removal, "the plaintiff seeks to join additional
defendants whose joinder prior to removal would have
destroyed subject matter jurisdiction. 6 8 Congress has
yet to take a specific position on "pendent party" jurisdiction in the removal context. Section 1447(e) provides
that, in the post-removal pendent party situation, the "court
may deny joinder, or permit joinder and remand the action to the State court."' 69 Note, however, that Congress
forbids joinder of these "pendent parties" unless the case
is then remanded to state court.70
Id.
Perkins, 744 F. Supp. at 175-76.
28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. X, § 1016(c), 102
Stat. 4642, 4670 (1988).
There is tension between section 1441(d) added in 1976 by the For67 See id.
eign Sovereign Immunities Act and section 1447(e) regarding pendent party jurisdiction. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 144 1(d) (1988) with 28 U.S.C. 1447(e), as amended by
Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. X, § 1016(c), 102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (1988). Perhaps the
ninth circuit decided Chuidian was incorrect and that Birkinshaw was the correct
decision. The unique legislative history of section 144 1(d), whoever, supports the
Chuidan decision. Chuidian, 912 F.2d at 1098-99.
28 U.S.C. § 1447(e), as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. X, § 1016(c)(1),
102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (1988).
69 Id. Amended section 1447(e) also provides that an order of remand may require the payment of just costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees. Id.
70 See, e.g., Righetti v. Shell Oil Co., 711 F. Supp. 531 (N.D. Cal. 1989)(after
defendants removed case to federal court, plaintiffs sought leave to amend complaint by substituting one defendant for another, which destroyed diversity jurisdiction; thus, the case was remanded back to state court).
64
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Pendant-PartyJurisdiction Under the 1990 Act

The 1990 Act established a new basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction, referred to as Supplemental Jurisdiction. 7 ' By enacting section 1367, Congress responded
to the Supreme Court's invitation in Finley to establish
some boundaries for the exercise of pendent-party jurisdiction. Section 1367(a) grants the federal courts original
jurisdiction over pendent parties (and claims), in federal

I

Sec. 310. Supplemental Jurisdiction. (A) GRANT OF JURISDICTION. Chapter 85 of the title 28, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end
thereof the following new section:
Section 1367 Supplemental jurisdiction:
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which
the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall
have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that
they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of
the United States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall
include claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional
parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district
courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a)
over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under rule 15,
19, 20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims
by persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under rule 19 of such
rules, or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under rule 24 of such
rules, when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims
would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section
1332.
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if (1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law.
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or
claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction.
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling
reasons for declining jurisdiction.
(d) the period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily
dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim
under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and
for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides
for a longer tolling period.
28 U.S.C. § 1367, as added by Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310, 104 Stat. 5089, 5113-14
(1990).
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question cases, to the constitutional limits of Article J11.72
Section 1367(b) disallows pendent-party jurisdiction in
cases founded solely on diversity jurisdiction.73
F. Non-removal Provisions
Section 1445(c) provides that any action in state court
under the worker's compensation laws may not be removed.74 Certain other federal statutes also provide for a
similar "plaintiff's privilege" to choose which court system will hear the case. Securities cases brought under the
1933 Act and FELA cases are good examples of this genre
of cases.75
The most interesting question under section 1445(c) is
how to characterize a wrongful discharge cause of action
brought after an alleged firing or filing of a worker's compensation claim. Section 1445(c) has been held by federal
district courts in Texas to make such claims non-removable.7 6 One court has held that a direct suit against a
worker's compensation insurance carrier for breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing is non-removable
under section 1445(c).7 7 Another court held that where
the worker's compensation claim is joined in the state
court with a claim presenting a federal question, the case
can be removed because the worker's compensation claim
72 Note that Finley refused to address of just what the constitutional limits are
with respect to pendent-party jurisdiction.
73 Section 1367(c) codifies certain abstention doctrines regarding pendent
claims, and section 1367(d) provides for tolling of limitations periods to protect
dismissed litigants.
74

28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (1988).

See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text for discussion.
See Soto v. Tonka Corp., 716 F. Supp. 977 (W.D. Tex. 1989) (court held that
§ 1445(c) makes cases alleging discharge in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation claim non-removable); Chavez v. Farah Mfg. Co., 715 F. Supp. 177
(W.D. Tex. 1989)(when plaintiff claims wrongful discharge for filing a worker's
compensation claim defendant employer cannot remove to federal court); Watson
v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 715 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Tex. 1989)(plaintiff's action
to receive full amount of benefits awarded to her by the Texas Industrial Accident
Board is non-removable to federal court); Wallace v. Ryan-Walsh Stevedoring
Co., 708 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Tex. 1989)(wrongfulIdischarge case for filing
worker's compensation question not removable to federal court).
7-

76

17

Watson, 715 F. Supp. at 797.

410

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[57

is pendent to the federal question.78
Finally, when a non-removable claim is joined with a
"separate and independent" cause of action, the non-removable claim can be removed to federal court under section 1441(c) which takes precedence over non-removal
provisions. 79
III.

REMOVAL AND REMAND PROCEDURES

Procedurally, there are many pitfalls for the unwary
within removal and remand procedures, along with several significant new developments in this area of the law.
A.

Who Can Remove

Questions still remain concerning just who may remove
a case to federal court. Defendants can clearly remove,
unless they are diverse defendants sued in their own
state's courts.8 0 The Fifth Circuit, however, embraces the
minority position which also allows third-party defendants
to remove."' At the same time, a federal court in Dallas
held that an intervenor may not remove a case from state
court 8

2

78 Nabors v. City of Arlington, 688 F. Supp. 1165 (E.D. Tex. 1988)(statute
prohibiting removal of action under worker's compensation laws did not preclude
the district court from exercising pendent jurisdiction over employee's retaliatory
discharge claim following removal of civil rights claim with which it was joined).
7o See Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Hamilton Hotel Partners, 702 F. Supp.
1417, 1420 (W.D. Ark. 1988); Cacioppe v. Superior Holsteins III, Ltd., 650 F.
Supp. 607, 609 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
so See Getty Oil Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. America, 841 F.2d 1254, 1258 (5th
Cir. 1988); Petty v. Ideco, Inc., 761 F.2d 1146, 1148 n.1 (5th Cir. 1985).
81 See Carl Heck Eng'r v. Lafourche Parish Police Jury, 622 F.2d 133, 136 (5th
Cir. 1980). But see Queen Victoria Corp. v. Insurance Specialists of Haw., Inc.,
711 F. Supp. 553, 554 (D. Haw. 1989).
82 J. Baxter Brinkman Oil and Gas Corp. v. Thomas, 682 F. Supp. 898, 899-900
(N.D. Tex. 1988). In this case, the intervenor voluntarily injected itself into the
suit and thus the situation was analogous to voluntary-involuntary rule situations.
It is difficult to align this analogy with the Carl Heck case, which allows third-party
defendant removals. Certainly, a plaintiff cannot be said to voluntarily make an
action removable if it is the action of a defendant, an impleader, which makes the
case removable. For the same reason, it is also hard to square Carl Heck itself with
the voluntary-involuntary rule.
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Where to Remove

In addition, interesting questions about the proper
state court from which a case may be removed have recently been addressed under certain special statutes. Particularly, under FIRREA, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) may remove a case to federal district
court even when the case is pending in a state court of
appeals.8 3 Moreover, once the case arrives in federal
court, all orders entered by the state court remain in effect
unless the federal court chooses to vacate them. 4 After
removal the federal court may then rely completely on the
state court record to justify the order in question, so that
de novo examination of the evidence or facts is not required. 8s The propriety of the now "federalized" state
court order, however, must be judged under the closest
analogous federal, not state, rules.8 6
C.

Formal Changes and Specific Allegations

Section 1016(b)(1) of the Judicial Improvements Act
changed the name of the document which affects removal.
"Notice of Removal" has replaced "Petition for Removal." '8 7 Another formal requirement, that of verifying
the Petition of Removal, now the Notice of Removal, has
been eliminated. The Notice, however, is subject to rule
11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.88 Furthermore, a removal bond is no longer required. 9
When removing a case, certain formal modes about
which "the law demands strict adherence" apply. 90 One is
83 See In re Meyerland Co. (FDIC v. Meyerland Co.), 910 F.2d 1257, 1258-63
(5th Cir.), reh'g granted, 921 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1990) (Congress clearly intended
federal court removal jurisdiction to reach cases not merely in the post-judgment
phase, but also after appeal begins in the state court).
84 See Nissho-Iwai Am. Corp. v. Kline, 845 F.2d 1300, 1303 (5th Cir. 1988).
-5 Id. at 1304.
86 Id.
at 1303.
28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), as amended by Judicial Improvements and Access to justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. X, § 1016(b)(l), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988).
88 Id.; see FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
m928 U.S.C. § 1446, as amended by 28 U.S.C. § 1016(b)(3) (1988).
w Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1259.
87
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the necessary allegations of corporate citizenship. 9 A
corporation must state both its place of incorporation and
its principal place of business to affirmatively allege citizenship. 92 It is not sufficient to aver that a corporation
does not have its principal place of business in a state in
which the opposite party claims its citizenship, so that diversity is established "argumentatively or by mere inference." 93 On the contrary, jurisdictional allegations must
be "clear, distinct and precise. ' 94 Also, when alleging
citizenship, diversity is not established by averring "residency," since "residency" is not equivalent to "citizenship" for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 95
D.

Time Limitations

1. Removal
An interesting timing question is presented where there
are multiple defendants in a removable case and they are
served at different times. Several logical options exist.
First, removal might be allowed if each defendant files a
Notice of Removal, or joins in one,9 6 within thirty days of
being served. Second, removal may only be allowed
within the thirty day period beginning when the first de91

Id.

Id.
93 Id. (citing Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R. v. Pargas, Inc., 706 F.2d 633, 636 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1983)).
92

9

Id.

91 See, e.g., Keller v. Honeywell Protective Serv., 742 F. Supp. 425, 427 (N.D.
Ohio 1990) (residency is not equivalent to citizenship); Stiegler v. McQuesten,
198 U.S. 141, 143 (1905) (residency and citizenship are wholly different concepts). Formal defects can sometimes be cured under 28 U.S.C. § 1653. See 28
U.S.C. § 1653 (1988). Section 1653 allows technical defects in the notice of removal, including defective allegations of citizenship, to be cured at any time, so
long as the party seeking to cure the defective allegations has not engaged in bad
faith or undue delay. Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1258 n.5.
In multiple defendant removal situations, not all defendants must actually file
ajoint Notice of Removal. Instead, all that is required is for every served defendant to either file a Notice of Removal, or file some written instrument with the
federal court which formally concurs with the existing Notice of Removal. Getty
Oil, 841 F.2d at 1262 n.1 1. However, it must be clear that every served defendant
has actually filed a Notice or ajoinder. Unsupported averments are insufficient to
show consent to removal. Id.
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fendant is served. Each served defendant must have
either filed a Notice of Removal, or have joined in one, by
the expiration of thirty days after service on the firstserved defendant. The Fifth Circuit has opted for the latter approach.9 7 To alleviate some of the potential abuse
inherent in this rule, the Fifth Circuit allows, in "exceptional circumstances," removal "when a later-joined defendant petitions more than precisely thirty days after the
first defendant is served."9 8
When a case is not initially removable, but later becomes so because of some procedural act of the plaintiff,
questions can arise about precisely when the case became
removable. The answer to this timing question is a matter
of state law. For example, in Recognition Equipment,99 a federal court faced the question of precisely when a case became removable. The court held that because parties
were added to a state court amended petition without
leave of court, in violation of Texas Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 41, the amended petition did not suffice to begin the removal time-clock running. 00 The time did not
begin to run until leave was granted by the state court.' 0 '
In a significant new statute, section 1016(b) of the Judicial Improvements Act imposes new and additional time
limitations on removals. 0 2 Under prior law, any diversity
or federal question case could be removed from state
court at virtually any time if the case was removed within
thirty days after first becoming removable. 0 3 This was
Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1262-63.
98 Id. at 1263 n.12 (citing Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478, 481 (5th Cir.
1981)). Conversely, if a defendant is joined after removal has been accomplished,
that defendant (who, for example may not be diverse) may move to remand the
case back to state court. See Getty Oil, 841 F.2d at 1263; 28 U.S.C. § 1448 (1988).
CA3-88-0761-T (N.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 1988).
Id.; see TEx. R. Civ. P.41.
101
Id.
102 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1988).
103Id. Depending upon when the case first becomes removable, 30 days is not
always allowed for removal. In some circumstances, waiver of the right to remove
occurs when a defendant waits for a half-hour during a break in a state court trial
to file a removal petition. See Walker v. A.T. & T. Co., 684 F. Supp. 475,478 (S.D.
Tex. 1988) (diverse defendant's fifteen minute to one hour delay in notifying
97
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true even if the case first becomes removable years after it
was filed.' 0 4 Section 1446(b) as amended now contains a
"statute of limitations" for removal, but for diversity actions only.'0 5 Section 1446(b) now provides that a diversity action may not be removed more than one year after
10 6
the action is commenced.

2.

Remand

Another significant procedural change was made by
section 1016(c) of the Judicial Improvements Act.10 7 Section 1447(c) was amended to limit the time within which
certain Motions to Remand can be filed. As amended,
section 1447(c) provides that a Motion to Remand based
on "any defect in removal procedure"'0 8 must be made
within thirty days after the filing of the Notice of
Removal. 0 9
An interesting question arises under the new thirty day
limitation on Motions to Remand and involves whether, in
light of the amendment, a court retains the power to remand a case sua sponte for defects in removal procedure.
plaintiff it wanted to remove the case to federal court during a settlement conference held while the trial was ongoing and following voluntary dismissal of a nondiverse defendant estopped the diverse defendant from removing the case).
- For instance, if the only non-diverse party is dropped by the plaintiff, thus
creating diversity jurisdiction, the case could be removed at that time. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b) (1988). The elimination of the non-diverse party must be the voluntary
act of the plaintiff or diversity jurisdiction still will not attach. See Weems v. Louis
Dreyfus Corp., 380 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1967); Walker, 684 F. Supp. at 477;
Higgens v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 635 F. Supp. 1182, 1184 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
1- 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. X,
§ 1016(b)(2)(B), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988).
- Id. For the purposes of determining when the one-year removal limitation
period begins, the fact that other defendants are added later in the case is irrelevant. The one-year period begins when the action was filed against the initial
defendant. See Royer v. Harris Well Serv., Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1247, 1248-49 (M.D.
La. 1990)(applying state law to determine when the action was commenced, the
court found the action commenced upon filing suit).
,0-28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. X, § 1016(c)(1),

102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (1988).
ogId. Determining those defects which are "procedural" and those which are
"substantive" should prove an interesting, perhaps perplexing, exercise for federal courts.
Ills

Id.
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The resolution to this question pits the Third Circuit
against the Northern District of Texas."10
One issue in this area is whether a sua sponte remand is,
or is not, equivalent to a motion to remand, albeit the
court's own motion. The Third Circuit treated the two as
substantially similar and held that after the thirty day
limit, the court had no power to remand the case because
of removal defects."' The northern district of Texas
reached the opposite conclusion. 1 2 Yet, this whole discussion of whether a "motion" is at issue seems to miss
the point. The focus should not be on the first sentence
of section 1447(c): "A motion to remand the case on the
basis of any defect in removal procedure must be made
within thirty days after the filing of the notice of removal
under section 1446(a)"" 13 ; but upon the second sentence,
which states: "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdic' 4
tion, the case shall be remanded." "1
Given the present statutory scheme and the controlling
case law," 5 the analysis must focus on whether specific
statutory authorization exists to remand a case. Certainly,
one ground for removal could have been an untimely removal. Removal, however, is untimely only if the complaint is not made within the statutorily authorized time
limits. 116 After the time limit passes, the statute no longer
authorizes remand on the basis of that defect. When authorization expires, the only ground for remand (whether
by motion or sua sponte) contemplated by section 1447(c)
10 Compare Air-Shields, Inc. v. Fullam, 891 F.2d 63 (3d Cir. 1989) (court may
not remand sua sponte for removal defects) with FDIC v. Lloyd, 744 F. Supp. 126
(N.D. Tex. 1990)(court may remand sua sponte for removal defects).
,,, Air-Shields, 891 F.2d at 66.
112 Lloyd, 744 F. Supp. at 133.
,1. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. X, § 1016(c)(1),
102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (1988).
114

Id.

115See, e.g., Thermtron Prod., Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336 (1976).
,- Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b), as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. X,
§ 1016(b)(2)(B), 102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988).
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is lack of subject matter jurisdiction." 7 Therefore, because the court only has jurisdiction when a procedural
defect is at issue, the court cannot remand the case on its
own motion." 8
A recent Fifth Circuit case bolsters this decision when it
succinctly states that "a court may consider remand only if
the parties raise the issue; conversely, a court must consider the existence of subject matter jurisdiction on its
own motion."" 9 Therefore, the result reached by the
Third Circuit in Air Shields is correct; after the thirty day
period for filing procedural remand motions, a court cannot remand a case to state court sua sponte for defects in
removal procedure. This conclusion is surely the correct
one; although FDIC v. Lloyd remains pending on appeal, 2 0° the Fifth Circuit has clearly telegraphed its opinion on the propriety of a sua sponte post-thirty day remand
in the recent significant decisions styled In re Shell Oil
Co. 121

In Shell Oil I the district court granted an untimely motion to remand based upon the presence in the action of a
forum state defendant. On writ of mandamus, the Fifth
Circuit first addressed whether the presence of a forum
state defendant in a removed action was a defect in "removal procedure."'' 22 The court defined "procedural"
defects to encompass every sort of defect which was not a
defect in subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, because Article III jurisdiction exists even in the absence of complete
11
28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. X, § 1016(c)(1),
102 Stat. 4642, 4670 (1988).
-8See Thermtron, 423 U.S. at 342-45. In this famous case, the Supreme Court
authorized mandamus to order a district court to vacate an order of remand which
was based upon crowded docket conditions, which is not grounds for remand authorized by statute. Id. at 342-52.
119Ziegler v. Champion Mortgage Co., 913 F.2d 228, 230 (5th Cir. 1990).
120 No. 91-1714 (argued June 3, 1991). A fifth circuit panel consisting ofJudges
Thornberry, Jolly and Wiener heard the case. See 8 Fifth Cir. Rptr. 706 (July
1991).
121 In re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1518 (5th Cir. 1991) (Shell Oil I); In re Shell Oil
Co., 932 F.2d 1523 (5th Cir. 1991) (Shell Oil II).
'V2 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), a diversity action wherein a forum state defendant has been properly joined and served is not removable.
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diversity, the presence of the forum
state defendant was
23
found to be a procedural defect.
Significantly in the Shell Oil I discussion of the procedural/jurisdictional dichotomy, the Third Circuit's holding in Air-Shields,' 2 4 was discussed and cited with approval,
with the Fifth Circuit specifically stating that, by moving
to remand past the thirty-day limit, "plaintiffs have waived
any non-jurisdictional grounds for remand existing at the
time of removal."' 25 This is significant because once the
right to remand is waived, it is inconsistent with removal
and remand statutes for the district court to unilaterally
revive the right and exercise it on behalf of a party.
Therefore, in Shell Oil I, the Fifth Circuit issued a writ of
mandamus to vacate the remand order entered by the district court. Certainly, if the district court had the power to
remand for procedural defects after the 30-day limit, the
fifth circuit would not have issued the writ of mandamus
merely because the party's remand motion was tardy.
Tardiness under the circumstances would be a wholly
harmless error if the district court had the power to act on
its own and remand the action on the same procedural
basis at any time.
3.

The Interplay Between the New Time Limits

Fascinating questions arise when the new statutes of
limitations on removal and remand collide. The problem
is as follows: a defendant removes the case more than one
year after filing, but the plaintiff fails to move to remand
the case within the thirty day limit. The statutory question is, of course, whether removal outside of the one-year
limit is a procedural defect. The few courts which have
addressed this situation have reached diametrically opposite results.
Without discussion, the district court for the northern
Shell Oil 1, 932 F.2d at 1521-23.
The court noted, without comment, that the district court in FDIC v. Lloyd
reached a different conclusion.
1" Shell Oil 1, 932 F.2d at 1523.
12.
124
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district of California held that a plaintiff waives any complaint about a removal outside of the one-year limit if a
Motion to Remand is not made within thirty days of the
Notice of Removal. 26 The eastern district of Wisconsin,
after a thorough analysis, reached the same result. 27 The
district court for the northern district of Illinois ruled the
opposite way after analyzing the language of the statute
and its legislative history. The Illinois court held that the
waived by
one-year limitation is jurisdictional and is not 28
days.'
thirty
within
remand
failure to move for
The Foiles opinion appears to be incorrect while Gray
and Leidolf are correct. Although the Foiles court is right
when it points out that section 1446(b) states clearly and
emphatically that a diversity case may not be removed after one year, 129 the significance of this language vis-a-vis a
waiver argument is problematic. A statute of limitations,
when pleaded and proven, completely extinguishes a
cause of action on the merits. Yet even this draconian advantage may be waived by someone entitled to assert it.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically mention statutes of limitations in rule 8(c) as an affirmative
defense which must be pleaded. 130 Certainly, a time limitation on removal should be entitled to no more sanctity
than are statutes of limitations on the merits of claims.
Furthermore, the Foiles court's alternative, making the
one-year limitation on removal jurisdictional and not subject to waiver, is wholly unjustified given that the similar
thirty day limitation on removing any then-removable action ' 3 is clearly non-jurisdictional and subject to
waiver. 132
Gray v. Moore Business Forms, Inc., 711 F. Supp. 543, 545 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
Leidolf v. Eli Lilly & Co., 728 F. Supp. 1383, 1387-88 (E.D. Wis. 1990).
28 Foiles v. Merrell Nat'l Labs, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 108, 110 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
129 Id.
1so FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
1.11This is especially true since the 30 day limitation is located in the same subsection of § 1446(c). See U.S.C. § 1446(c) (1988).
1-32 See, e.g., Woodlands II v. City Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 703 F. Supp. 604, 607
(N.D. Tex. 1989) and cases cited therein.
12c

127
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The Foiles court also ignored the fact that the one-year
removal limitation was placed in section 1446 which is
solely concerned with removal procedure. Although this
"location" was noted, the court stated that "Congress is
not required ... to write and amend its statutes with the
kind of semantic exactitude valued by lawyers."' 133 Perhaps if section 1446 were the only removal statute, the
court would have a point. The court simply ignored the
fact that if Congress indeed meant for the one-year removal limitation to be jurisdictional, the limitation would
have been placed in section 1445 which discusses non-removable actions, or at least in section 1441(a) which covers the removability of diversity actions.
The Gray and Leidolf holdings are more consistent with
the general statutory scheme in recognizing that the oneyear limitation should not be treated as jurisdictional. Accordingly, a failure to properly move to remand a case
based on this defect should be subject to waiver.
E. Appellate Relief
Ordinarily, appellate relief from an order of remand is
unavailable. 34 The exceptions to this general rule are:
(1) removals under the civil rights removal provision of
section 1443;1 5 (2) where the remand is made on grounds
not authorized by section 1447(c);' 36 and (3) where the
FDIC is appealing under the FIRREA.137 In addition,
even when appellate relief of the merits of the remand are
unavailable, the court of appeals may still entertain an appeal from any order awarding
sanctions in connection
38
case.'
the
of
remand
with the
133Foiles, 730 F. Supp. at 111.
134 See, e.g., Browning v. Navarro, 743 F.2d 1069, 1077 (5th Cir. 1984) (district
court's remand orders are unreviewable on direct appeal).
135 Id. at 1077 n.23.
136 Id.; see supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text for a discussion.
137 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(c) (1988); see In re Meyerland Co., 910 F.2d 1257,
1259 (5th Cir. 1990).
'.-See Fowler v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 915 F.2d 616, 617 (11th Cir.
1990)(order assessing costs related to remand of a case is not excluded from appellate review).
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In what is probably the most important decision in the
area of appellate relief from remand orders since the
Supreme Court's Thermtron decision in 1976, the Fifth Circuit recently expanded reviewability in Shell Oil 1.19 Prior
to its modification by the 1988 Act, section 1447(d), as
interpreted by the Thermtron Court, prohibited appellate
review of any remand order based upon section 1447(c).
Old section 1447(c) mandated remand in cases of "improvident" removal or lack of jurisdiction. 40 The 1988
Act changed section 1447(c) by dropping the "improvident removal" language. The Fifth Circuit held that this
amendment opened the door to appellate review of certain orders of remand which are based upon defects in
removal procedure, as opposed to those based upon lack
4
of subject matter jurisdiction.' 1
The writs of mandamus sought in the Shell Oil cases
were from remand orders which were filed outside the
thirty-day limit. The Fifth Circuit expressly reserved the
question of whether appellate relief was available in situations where a non-jurisdiction based remand order followed a timely remand motion. 42 The court did say,
however, that it is "arguable" that appellate relief would
be unavailable in such situations. 43 Given the strong language limiting the reviewability of remand orders in section 1447(d), and the limited nature of the original
Thermton exception thereto, it is likely that remand orders
based upon procedural defects, which follow timely motions to remand, will be non-reviewable.
Although one can question the fairness of section
1447(d)'s limitations on review, interpreting that section
to allow reviewability of remand orders based upon procedural defect, following timely remand motions, would
be improper. The prior version of section 1447(c) speci,9 932 F.2d at 1518.
140

14,
142
143

Id. at 1519.
Id. at 1520; Shell Oil II, 932 F.2d at 1525-26.
Shell Oil 1, 932 F.2d at 1520 n.5; Shell Oil I, 932 F.2d at 1526 n.4.
Id.

1991]

REMOVAL JURISDICTION

421

fled two types of remands which were beyond appellate
jurisdiction: orders based upon "improvident" removals
and orders based upon lack ofjurisdiction. Amended section 1447(c) retains the bar against review ofjurisdictionally based orders, but replaces improvident removal with
procedurally defective removals complained of within
thirty days of removal. Thus, if the ground for remand is
an alleged procedural defect brought to the court's attention within thirty days of removal, an order of remand
based thereon is not reviewable. The only alternative is to
allow appellate review of any non-jurisdictionally based
remand order. It is inconceivable, however, that such a
radical alteration of the availability of appellate review was
intended by the amendment. This is especially true given
the Shell Oil cases, wherein the Fifth Circuit created a
world in which only two types of removal defects exist.
There are defects in subject matter jurisdictions and all
other defects. The court deemed "all others" to be "procedural defects."
Combining such an expansive definition of procedural
defects with an interpretation of section 1447(c), allowing
review of all remands based upon defects in removal procedure, would render section 1447(d)'s prohibitions on
review almost meaningless. Such a view would allow appellate review of a remand order in every case where Article III jurisdiction existed. Thus, it is obvious that review
of remand orders which are based upon defects in removal procedure, but which follow timely motions to remand, are not subject to appellate review. If, however,
the court orders a remand based upon a procedural defect, but a remand motion was not filed within thirty days,
appellate relief would be available.

Comments

